Honest sexual signalling requires that the level of advertisement reveals mate quality. In the three-spined stickleback, Gasterosteus aculeatus, females base their mate choice mainly on the intensity of the males' red breeding coloration. Different results have, however, been obtained on the relationship between red breeding coloration and physical condition. In this study, the relationship was curvilinear in a natural population, with males in good and poor condition (measured as lipid content) having larger red areas than males of intermediate condition. By manipulating food intake and thus male condition prior to breeding, I further show that poor condition can induce an increase in signalling effort. This effect was further strengthened when the predation cost of signalling was increased by exposing the males to predators. This suggests that the reason for the high signalling effort of males in poor condition is their low probability of future reproduction and thus lower cost of signalling in terms of loss of future reproductive opportunities. Males in poor condition signal as a terminal effort and take larger risks and invest more in current reproduction than males in good condition. Finally, I discuss whether an effect of decreasing residual reproductive value on signalling effort could result in the breakdown of the honesty of the signal.
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In many species, females base their mate choice on the degree of exaggeration of the males' secondary sexual characters (reviewed by Andersson 1994). Two main mechanisms have been proposed to explain the evolution of such mating preferences: direct selection on preference genes and indirect genetic effects (reviewed by Kirkpatrick & Ryan 1991; Andersson 1994) . According to the direct selection mechanism, preferences evolve because of direct fitness benefits for females. The indirect mechanism, on the other hand, claims that preferences evolve because of genetic benefits to the offspring, that is, the inheritance of genes for attractiveness (Fisher 1915 (Fisher , 1930 or viability (Zahavi 1975 (Zahavi , 1977 .
Whether the benefits are direct or indirect, a prerequisite for female choice is that the level of exaggeration indicates the benefits in question honestly. According to Zahavi's handicap principle, signals will be honest only if constrained by the differential costs of producing and maintaining them, that is, the exaggeration of the trait has to be more costly for males of low than high quality (Zahavi 1975 (Zahavi , 1977 Grafen 1990a, b) , unless the signals are in some sense uncheatable. However, theoretical models indicate that signals need only be honest 'on average' for a signalling system to be stable (Johnstone & Grafen 1993; Kokko 1997) . Dishonest signalling could occur in a stable system provided that the frequency of 'cheaters' is sufficiently low. Signallers could be dishonest if they differ in their signalling strategies because of variation in the costs or benefits of signalling or in their relatedness to the receiver (Johnstone & Grafen 1993) or if the expression of the trait is subject to a life history trade-off between present and future signalling effort (Kokko 1997) .
Several empirical studies have investigated the costs and honesty of signals. In the majority of published studies, a positive correlation between signal expression and some putative measure of quality has been found, and in some of these there is evidence of fecundity benefits or higher survival of offspring (reviewed by Johnstone 1995). The honest indicator process is thus supported by empirical evidence.
In the three-spined stickleback, Gasterosteus aculeatus, females base their mate choice mainly on the intensity of the males' red breeding coloration (reviewed by Rowland 1994), which is due to carotenoids that the male acquires through feeding (Wedekind et al. 1998) . The coloration may work as a handicap as it is energetically costly (Frischknecht 1993) , increases the risk of predation (Moodie 1972; Whoriskey & FitzGerald 1985) and
